Another Round Of Stimulus Anyone?

Although most economists proclaim the recession to be at an end, the expected surge in foreclosure and unemployment rates could precipitate the recurrence of a recession which has some economists calling for more government stimulus. The argument is that another round of effective stimulus could prevent the slowest recovery in modern memory. See the following from Economist's View.

As many of us have been saying for some time now, more stimulus would speed the recovery -- the jobs outlook is particularly worrisome -- but unfortunately, it doesn't appear that more stimulus is politically feasible:

The Case for More Stimulus, Editorial, NY Times: The consensus among economists is that the recession is over, and, technically, the herd is probably right. ... Immense federal stimulus has jolted the economy.

But... The economy is going to need more government support, or it is bound to be very weak for a very long time — and vulnerable to a relapse into recession. Unemployment is expected to worsen well into next year, exceeding 10 percent. Foreclosures are expected to rise, which will push home values down further. Hundreds of small and midsize banks are likely to fail in coming years. State and local governments face budget shortfalls in 2010 that are as bad or worse than this year’s.

Yet Washington is not providing a coherent plan for effective stimulus. The Senate has been hamstrung for nearly a month over the most basic relief-and-recovery boost: an extension of unemployment benefits. ... Lawmakers in both parties fret that large budget deficits preclude more stimulus, lest the burden of debt outweigh the benefit of deficit spending. ... Deficits are a serious issue, but the immediate need for stimulus trumps the longer-term need for deficit reduction. A self-reinforcing stretch of economic weakness would be far costlier than additional stimulus.

The Senate could take a step in the right direction by extending unemployment benefits without further delay. ... Next, Congress and the administration should agree on ways to ease the dire financial condition of the states. Most important is continued aid for state Medicaid programs... As long as the states are suffering, any economic recovery efforts by the federal government are undermined. ...

Without another round of effective stimulus, the worst recession in modern memory will likely become — at best — the weakest recovery in modern memory. Another boost to federal spending that is targeted and timely should not be too much for politicians to deliver.

Recall this recent graph from the San Francisco Fed:



Output is not expected to return to potential until well into 2012.

Now recall the long delay between the end of the last two recessions and the peak in the unemployment rate (or just about any other labor market indicator):



And the recovery for the labor market could be even slower this time.

To be fully effective, plans for additional stimulus should have been in place long ago. However, given how long the recovery is expected to take, it's not too late to do more if we get started right away. But the political climate makes it highly unlikely that labor markets and the economy will get the help that they need.

This post has been republished from Mark Thoma's blog, Economist's View.

Is France's Stimulus Package More Effective Than The US Stimulus?

France's approach to stimulus spending contrasts pretty sharply with the US approach. Instead of spending on long-term infrastructure projects designed to stimulate the economy in both the short and long-term, France is focusing on getting funds out quickly to citizens with public works projects like restoring famous landmarks. The French minister in charge of the stimulus says their strategy is better, but is it? Economist Mark Thoma examines this question in the following post.

The "cheese-eating surrender monkeys" say that when it comes to stimulus programs, “The country that is behind is the U.S., not France.”:

France, Unlike U.S., Is Deep Into Stimulus Projects, by Nelson D. Schwartz, NY Times: French workers normally take off much of the summer, but this month,... throngs of tourists will be jostling alongside stonemasons, restoration experts and other artisans paid by the French government’s $37 billion economic stimulus program.

Their job? Maintain in pristine condition the 800-year-old palace of more than 1,500 rooms where Napoleon bid adieu before being exiled to Elba and where Marie Antoinette enjoyed a gilded boudoir.

Besides Fontainebleau, about 50 French chateaus are to receive a facelift, including the palace of Versailles. Also receiving funds are some 75 cathedrals like Notre Dame in Paris. A museum devoted to Lalique glass is being created in Strasbourg, while Marseilles is to be the home of a new 10 million euro center for Mediterranean culture.

All told, Paris has set aside 100 million euros in stimulus funds earmarked for what the French like to call their cultural patrimony. It is a French twist on how to overcome the global downturn, spending borrowed money avidly to beautify the nation even as it also races ahead of the United States in more classic Keynesian ways: fixing potholes, upgrading railroads and pursuing other “shovel ready” projects.

“America is six months behind; it has wasted a lot of time,” said Patrick Devedjian, the minister in charge of the French relance, or stimulus. By the time Washington gets around to doling out most of its money, Mr. Devedjian sniffed, “the crisis could be over.” ...

As it turns out, France’s more centralized, state-directed economy ... is proving remarkably effective at deploying funds quickly and efficiently in bad times. ...

It is easier to find money for castles and cathedrals, of course, in a country that believes “art is equal to other investments, not secondary,” as Mr. Devedjian puts it. But the largess is driven as well by President Sarkozy’s support for more spending to combat the recession, even if it means borrowing more and running up big deficits.

That contrasts sharply with the commitment by the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, to hold down stimulus spending and move as quickly as possible to curb her government’s budget deficit.

So what about the criticism that Europe is not being as aggressive as the United States in combating the global slowdown, with only tepid stimulus packages? That’s not the way the French see it.

“You lost time with changing a president and no decisions were made in the last three months of 2008,” Mr. Devedjian jibed. “Nothing happened in January 2009, and in February, there was just a speech.”

“The country that is behind is the U.S.,” he said, “not France.”

While the scale, $37 billion versus close to $800 billion, is a bit different and probably ought to be accounted for in the comparison, there does seem to be a difference not just in the speed of deployment, but also in the focus of the policy. It will be interesting to see how that difference, which seems to place somewhat more emphasis on boosting employment and aggregate demand immediately than on long-run growth in France as compared to the U.S., translates into a differential response to the fiscal policy boosts in the two countries.

This post was republished from Mark Thoma's blog, Economist's View.

When Is The Obama Stimulus Going To Start Creating Jobs?

With the unemployment rate reaching the highest level in 26 years, the obvious question is: when is the Obama stimulus going to start creating some jobs? Shouldn't the funds be used to put people to work immediately rather than investing in long-term infrastructure projects that could take months to start? The following post from Economist's View discusses this topic further.

The stimulus package had two components, new spending and tax cuts. Everybody knew that the spending component would take time to put into place, six months or more for a lot of the infrastructure projects, and that meant that we needed something to increase demand and provide a bridge until the new spending comes online.

Enter the tax cuts that the GOP insisted upon, tax cuts that were a larger part of the stimulus package than I thought justified. These cuts were to come online immediately and stimulate demand until the spending could begin taking up some of the slack later in the year. I would have preferred targeted, non-infrastructure spending that could have been put in place almost as fast as the tax cuts (particularly those that simply require making existing programs more generous), but that type of spending was considered wasteful because it didn't add to our long-run capacity for growth and hence had little chance of being part of the stimulus package.

The problem was partly bad luck. A crisis hit and we had the bad luck of having an administration that opposed active intervention and though there was a bit of a stimulus attempt through a one time tax rebate, a strategy theory predicts won't do much to help, the real action in terms of stimulating the economy was left to the new administration. So nothing was done, nothing could have been done until the new administration took over, and given the insistence that any new spending be on infrastructure projects with clear benefits, tax cuts were the main hope for an immediate effect.

So if the policy has failed at this point, it is not the spending component since, fully consistent with predictions when it was enacted, it was going to be months before it could be of any help. What failed is the GOP's insistence that tax cuts be used to provide an immediate boost to the economy. Increasing food stamps, unemployment compensation, payments to help states with declining revenues and increasing demands for social services, payments to help unemployed workers maintain health care, digging (needed) holes, there were many, many other ways to provide more immediate relief and stimulate the economy at the same time, but no, it had to be tax cuts or nothing.

Finally, I want to note that what we maximize matters. For example, we can maximize GDP growth over the next ten or twenty years, or we can maximize employment over the next few months. Which we choose to maximize has a big effect on the policies we put in place. If we use the stimulus money to maximize GDP and growth - which is essentially what we did - that will have a much slower effect on employment than if we maximize employment directly. The efficiency argument always leads you to maximize output, and efficiency prevailed in the structure of the current package, but I think an argument can also be made that maximizing employment provides social benefits that are just as large, or larger.

Just noticed this, which makes a surprisingly similar point:

A Message to President Obama: Stop Priming the Pump, Hire the Unemployed, by Pavlina R. Tcherneva: Many have called President Obama’s stimulus plan a return to Keynesian policy. Some of us who like reading Keynes professionally or for leisure have already been scratching our heads. I have wondered in particular whether the plan isn’t set up to work in a manner completely backwards from what Keynes himself had in mind when he advocated economic stabilization by government.

There are two things to remember about Keynes’s fiscal policy proposals: 1) government spending was always linked to the goal of full employment... and 2) to achieve macro-stability and full employment, the government had to employ the unemployed directly into public works.

By contrast, most modern economists believe that 1) there is some natural level of unemployment that includes the structurally unemployed, which governments cannot generally tackle, and that 2) public employment is an inefficient use of public resources.

So, when the government is called to action, the economic profession has replaced Keynes’s “fiscal policy via public works” with a “leaky bucket pump-priming mechanism.”

How is the latter policy supposed to work? Instead of employing the unemployed directly, the idea is to generate large enough government expenditures to produce a level of economic growth that would, in turn, gradually reduce unemployment. For example, the government could spend money on various private sector contracts, stimulate different private industries, offer investment subsidies and tax cuts, and increase unemployment insurance payments, in hope that it will boost GDP sufficiently to reduce unemployment to desired levels. This is essentially the underlying logic behind President Obama’s stimulus package. But it is also a bit of a gamble.

Not all of these injections will be effective because the fiscal stimulus enters the economy through “a leaky bucket”. Some of the money will be lost in transit (because of administrative costs, for example) and much of it will have no direct job creation effects (e.g. the tax cut component of the recovery act). Nevertheless, despite this leaky bucket, the theory goes, sooner or later, large enough government expenditures will produce the kind of growth that would reduce unemployment. ...

All of this is ... why Keynes never had any “leaky bucket” or “pump priming” idea in mind. For him “the real problem fundamental yet essentially simple…[is] to provide employment for everyone” (Keynes 1980, 267) and the most bang for the buck from fiscal policy would be achieved via direct job creation. This he called “on the spot” employment via public works.

As I have argued elsewhere, it is useful to think of Keynesian fiscal policy, not as aggregate demand management, but as labor demand management. ...

Commentators often call this a policy of “make work” but Keynes didn’t advocate digging holes, burying jars with money and digging them out, or any other similarly worthless projects. The key was to marry the two goals: to employ the unemployed directly and to make sure that they do useful things. Once they are put to work on a particular project, Keynes argued, “there can be only one object in the economy, namely to substitute some other, better, and wiser piece of expenditure for it” (Keynes 1982, 146). We might as well ask a very basic question: is there really a shortage of useful things to do?

If we insist on calling ourselves Keynesians again, and more importantly, if President Obama’s plan for economic stabilization should generate rapid reduction in unemployment, it would help to set fiscal policy straight. Instead of relying on “leaky fiscal buckets” we could return to “labor demand management” a la Keynes that provides immediate employment opportunities to the unemployed via bold and creative public works projects, which generate useful output and services for all.

This post was republished from Mark Thoma's blog, Economist's View.

Phoenix Real Estate Market Showing Signs Of Life

The Phoenix real estate market was one of the hardest hit when the housing bubble popped, and it looks like it might be one of the first to rebound. Buyers are beginning to show heightened interested in the market, with one of the most attractive features being that buying is basically as cheap as renting. Typically when buying is cheaper than renting, people will buy — if they are able. However, with a tightened lending market, millions out of work and many with tarnished credit, the buyer pool is seemingly shrinking. Despite that, the Phoenix market appears to be on the right track, though, Tim Iacono cautions that this could be a small boom created by artificially low interest rates. Foreclosures are continuing to flood the market, and once interest rates go back up the new quasi-bubble could pop.

Evidence is mounting that when home prices tumble by more than 50 percent and the Fed keeps mortgage rates at freakishly low levels, people will buy houses. This report from the LA Times talks of a resurgence in home buying where prices have fallen the furthest.

After four years of renting because they were priced out of the real estate market, Jamia Jenkins and Scott Renshaw concluded the time had arrived for them to buy.

They saw that home prices had dropped so fast here -- faster than in any other big city in the nation -- that mortgage payments would be less than the $900 they paid in rent. The city is littered with foreclosed houses, so the couple figured they could easily snatch up something in the low $100,000s.

Three months later, they're still looking. They have submitted 13 offers and been overbid each time. "It's just pathetic," said Jenkins, 53. "Investors are going out there and outbidding everyone."

While many now cheer the arrival of a housing market bottom this year - more likely in real estate sales than in prices paid - you have to wonder what's going to happen in another year or two when long-term interest rates are much higher.

For example, at today's artificially low mortgage rates, you can get a 30-year loan of $170,000 for about $900, similar to what the couple above is planning. But at the far more typical rates of seven or eight percent, that payment moves up by one-third to about $1,200.

Stated another way, that same $900 payment only buys $130,000 worth of housing - not the $170,000 as indicated above - absent the freakishly low interest rates, something that is a near certainty in the years ahead.

Naturally, that doesn't stop people from buying, as the 2006 fever seems to have returned...

Phoenix's housing bust has turned into a quasi-boom, a sign that its market may have hit bottom and a sneak preview of what a national housing recovery could look like.

More homes are selling than at any time since 2006. Prices are slowly stabilizing. Buyers are once again finding themselves in frantic bidding wars -- only this time over foreclosed houses selling at deep discounts rather than ranch homes listing for vast sums.

"The free market is at work," said Shannon Hubbard, a real estate agent and blogger here. "Prices got driven down so much that people said, 'I'm going to come out and play.' "
Home prices continue to plummet or tread water in much of the nation, but there have been tentative signs of life. Pending home sales rose 3.2% nationally in April, the second month of increases after a record low in January.

John Burns Real Estate Consulting in February identified Phoenix as "the most unique market in the nation," where affordability was better than at any time since 1981 and buying a house was once again cheaper than renting.

It should be an interesting summer as waves of new foreclosures battle waves of new buying interest from a bargain hunting public that is still fearful of more job losses.

This post can also be found on themessthatgreenspanmade.blogspot.com.

So What Is The Fed's Next Move?

With the growing number of positive economic reports coming out, many people are questioning whether the economy has turned a corner. Have we really turned a corner, though, or are we seeing a temporary upswing? The Federal Reserve is playing a difficult game right now. If they leave rates low too long we could be faced with inflation, but if they raise them too quickly it could hamper the recovery. With this in mind, the Fed has some challenging decisions ahead of them. How are they going to respond? Mark Thoma looks at a recent article from Tim Duy that addresses this in his blog post below.

Turning Which Corner, by Tim Duy: Is the economy turning a corner? And, if so, which corner is it turning? In my view, economic activity has been influenced by two separate trends since 2007. One is the structural response to an over-leveraged household sector that pushed the US economy into what was initially a mild recession. The second trend is the sharp cyclical recession that began in earnest in the second half of 2008 as the commodity price shock decimated already weakened households and the deepening credit crunch cut financing for a broad swath of firms. Excess capacity emerged throughout the economy, triggering the familiar phenomenon of rising unemployment. Difficult though they may be, the cyclical dynamics do not last indefinitely - generally speaking, output declines stop well short of zero GDP and unemployment will not rise to 100%. Market participants are rightly anticipating the economy is turning the corner on the cyclical trend. But I suspect we have a long path ahead of us on the structural challenge poised by overleveraged households - suggesting that the green shoots we hear so much about will yield little more than stunted growth. This is why Bernanke and Co. are more likely to fertilize the fields than plan for the next harvest.

If there is one picture that sums up the cyclical story of the past year, it is the path of real consumption:

The sharp deceleration has come to an end, of that there can be little doubt. Nor should there be much surprise. The collapse in commodity prices, lower interest rates to allow mortgage refinancing for those homeowners still above water, and tax cuts all joined to provide powerful support for household budgets allowing consumption to stabilize despite the massive job losses experienced in recent months. The stabilization in consumer demand will eventually slow the pace of job cuts. Indeed, this is already evident in the data - analysts have pointed topeak of initial claims as a key hurdle in the race to recovery. To be sure, it is difficult if not impossible to characterize the data flow as "good." But it is certainly less "bad." The path to Great Depression II has hit something of a speedbump. And seeing that, market participants have priced out some of the most cataclysmic scenarios, supporting equities and commodities while pushing bond yields higher.

There will be more opportunities for euphoria - do not underestimate the power of pent-up demand to trigger bursts of positive data. There is a portion of the population who are not credit constrained, biding their time for the perfect moment to buy a new car or schedule a vacation. Indeed, such bursts of data are more likely than not following a sharp decline in activity (the 2.2% gain in consumption spending in 1Q09 is such an example). I believe, however, that those bursts of data will not be sustainable. Far from it - at a minimum, the ability of households to carry activity forward is at its end, which by itself would leave the economy floundering .

I think it is difficult to ignore the implications of the growth of consumer dominance in defining patterns of economic activity:

The story of the last 25 years has been an increasing role for household spending, rising to perhaps a peak of conspicuous consumption, with the motto "a filet mignon in every stainless steel oven, a RV in every garage." Patterns of economic development - more to the point, capital formation - have favored taking advantage of this trend. Countless business plans are based on the expectation that this trend will continue. The baby boomers have endless wealth (not so anymore, if it ever was), there is a never ending supply of equity rich Californians to support our [insert locality] housing market, etc. Those plans will be stressed, to say the least, if the trend stalls. The implications for a reversal are even more significant. And for those that believe reversal is necessary, note that the reversal has really not even begun. What took 25 years to build may take another 25 years to destroy.

How sure are we that the trend is at an end? My thought is that the factors that supported the trend - a steady march down in the saving rate to zero and a steady march up in household debt, coupled with monetary policy that had room to go from 15% short rates to zero over nearly three decades, are at an end. Even if you believe that savings rates will not rise to 12%, the inability to sustain below zero rates puts a limit on household spending growth (as well as debt accumulation). And with underwriting conditions tightening - a permanent tightening, given the changing regulatory environment - the role of debt financing in the life of the consumer is sure to stagnate.

The challenge then is to transition the economy away from the debt-supported consumption trend that looks no longer viable to a trend more reliant on investment and external spending. This, however, is easier said then done. How quickly can 25 years of growth directed at consumer spending be reversed? And reversed to what, especially if the rest of the world continues to struggle? I see little hope of an "immaculate conception" of a fresh, sustainable pattern of economic activity. Until the transition path reveals itself, fiscal policy will be necessary to fill the economic hole likely to exist if the savings proclivities of households continue to exceed the investment intentions of firms.

Ironically, the "best" road to growth is also the riskiest from a policy perspective - a rapid expansion of emerging market activity. Such an expansion, however, would once again place the US in competition for global resources, and threaten a reversal of the commodity and interest rate trends that have been so important to supporting US consumers. Indeed, just the whiff of recovery has supported oil prices, promising an abrupt end to one of the factors supporting US consumers. In the worst case scenario, a flight of capital away from the Dollar (in response to more promising investments abroad) would generate an inflationary and structural shock that would leave the Fed juggling between renewed recession and higher inflation. In short, the optimal external shock would be one only partially supportive; anything more would push the globe to a revisiting of the commodity price surge of early 2008. Looking for a decoupling story now, however, seems like almost a naïve dream.

What is the Fed's next move? One email crossed my inbox after the April employment report suggested some thinking that the Fed could hike rates as early as November. Such a scenario (absent a stability threatening run on the Dollar) must come from a spectacularly optimistic take on incoming data. Data, I might add, that is a reflection of the massive crutch provided by the Federal Reserve and US Treasury, not necessarily a sea change in the underlying economic environment. Look too how quickly bond rates began to climb after the Fed declined to expand Treasury purchases at the last FOMC meeting. More generally, consider this tidbit on Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke's thinking back in 2003:

The 2003 FOMC transcripts showed then-Governor Ben Bernanke very tuned into financial markets as he pressed for earlier release of Fed forecasts and a willingness to lower interest rates to zero.
From the June 2003 FOMC meeting, when the Fed lowered the target fed funds rate to 1%:

“I wonder if you might give some thought to whether or not it would make sense tactically to say publicly that we are willing to lower the federal funds rate to zero if necessary…I think it would have a beneficial effect on expectations in that there would no longer be a feeling in the market that we had reached the end of our rope.”

“It’s extremely important that we do what we can to maintain the supportive configuration in financial markets. That means continuing our easy monetary policy and, even more important, using our statement to signal our willingness to keep policy easy so long as there is a risk of further disinflation and continuing economic weakness."

A year and a half after the end of the 2001 recession, Bernanke was looking at the possibility of lowering rates to zero in order to maintain support for financial markets. And comparatively, financial markets were leaps and bounds healthier in 2003 than now. Is a rate hike really feasible this year - or even next - given the current state of dependence of the financial system on government largess? Moreover, consider the disinflation worries in 2003 and fast forward to last week:

Even after a recovery gets under way, the rate of growth of real economic activity is likely to remain below its longer-run potential for a while, implying that the current slack in resource utilization will increase further. We expect that the recovery will only gradually gain momentum and that economic slack will diminish slowly. In particular, businesses are likely to be cautious about hiring, implying that the unemployment rate could remain high for a time, even after economic growth resumes.

In this environment, we anticipate that inflation will remain low. Indeed, given the sizable margin of slack in resource utilization and diminished cost pressures from oil and other commodities, inflation is likely to move down some over the next year relative to its pace in 2008. However, inflation expectations, as measured by various household and business surveys, appear to have remained relatively stable, which should limit further declines in inflation.

Now consider the output gap over the last decade:

The current gap already far exceeds that of the last disinflationary scare, and Bernanke expects it to continue to expand further, and then diminish only gradually. As long as the gap continues to expand, Bernanke's bias will be in favor of additional easing. The only question is whether he remains content to allow TALF funds to slowly trickle into the economy, or speeds the pace of policy with expansions of longer dated Treasury purchases. Given Bernanke's past behavior, expecting patience on his part seems unrealistic. Moreover, the last jobs report provides less room for optimism than observers suggest. Importantly, Jim Hamilton notes the decline in hours worked appears unabated; threat of a currency collapse aside, there will be no policy tightening, only easing, until hours worked moves unquestionably and sustainably in a positive trajectory.

Bottom Line: The economy looks to be turning a corner relative to the downward cyclical force of last year. But this is only a partial victory, as the factors that that started us down this path - namely, a debt-supported consumer spending dynamic - remain in play, and will likely remain in play for years, arguing for a long period of slow growth, punctuated by short-lived bursts of positive data. In such an environment, and considering the importance of government support to sustain financial stability, the odds favor continued policy easing. Those looking for a more positive scenario are pinning their hopes on either an unlikely rapid return to past patterns of consumer behavior, an unlikely rapid evolution in patterns of economic activity that are not consumer dependent, or a decoupling of emerging market economic activity from the US (which could pose a different set of policy challenges).

This post can also be viewed on economistsview.typepad.com.

Could Legalizing Marijuana Help Solve California's Budget Problems?

The budget problems in California are well known across the nation, but one desperate idea to help balance the budget is sure to meet opposition from the rest of the country. California's governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, has apparently requested a full debate on the legalization of marijuana. The benefit — of course — to California if marijuana is legalized is that they can tax sales of the substance. According to a recent public opinion poll of California voters, a majority favor legalization of marijuana. Perhaps citizens feel that compared to the other budget cuts — and new taxes — on the table to shrink the deficit, legalizing marijuana might not be so bad. For more on the situation in California, read the following blog post from Tim Iacono.

It appears as though we'll be getting out of the Golden State in the nick of time as the fallout from the likely rejection by voters of most May 19th ballot initiatives is set to make things a whole lot worse for California's budget.

The Sacramento Bee reports on the relentless deterioration in the state's finances since the last budget bill was passed a few months back, one that really just forestalled the inevitable.

California's projected budget deficit has grown as large as $21.3 billion through next June because of a sharp economic decline, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger disclosed Monday in a letter to legislative leaders.

The latest projection means lawmakers will have to negotiate deep spending cuts in education, corrections and welfare as well as consider borrowing and new fees or taxes.

The announcement comes less than three months after the Legislature and the governor closed $34 billion of a then $40 billion state budget deficit with tax hikes and spending cuts and asked voters to eliminate the rest in next week's special election.

These "new" estimates will probably turn out to be just as overly optimistic as every previous forecast and once again, the state of California is blazing a trail for the rest of the country, this time on the road to insolvency.

There is more than a little irony in the Gubernator being voted into office some six years ago when his predecessor had similar problems that, in retrospect, look like a walk in the park by comparison, unless of course another housing bubble is in the offing.

New plans are being prepared to close the new budget gaps.

The governor did not disclose his solutions Monday. But he warned groups last week he will consider borrowing $2 billion from cities and counties, releasing low-level offenders in state prisons and reducing school funding by $3.6 billion. The state also could eliminate its planned $2 billion reserve.

"It's well beyond triage," said Senate President Pro Tem Darrell Steinberg, D-Sacramento. "We're talking about painful and difficult decisions. You can't just finesse your way through $15 billion or $21 billion."

It's odd how $15 billion or $20 billion really doesn't sound like a lot of money anymore...

Here's one way the state might be able to generate new revenue. After having been talked about for some time now, momentum is building to somehow find a way to tax marijuana (presumably, after legalizing it) as reported by the U.K. Guardian.

Arnold Schwarzenegger has never apologized for smoking pot – and loving it — at the height of his bodybuilding career in the 1970s. Now, as a struggling Republican governor of California reaching a crossroads in his political career, he might yet become America's most visible advocate for legalizing marijuana.

The actor-turned-politician gladdened the heart of every joint-roller and dope fiend across the Golden State earlier this week when he said it was time for a full debate on legalization.

Schwarzenegger was careful not to say too much – he stopped short of saying he was in favor of legalizing cannabis now – but his words broke a long-standing taboo among both Republicans and Democrats who have previously felt obliged to say marijuana must remain illegal, and marijuana users and pushers be subject to criminal prosecution.

The governor spoke in response to a new public opinion poll showing that 56% of registered voters in California favor legalizing and taxing marijuana – in part to help the state out of the worst budget crisis in its history.

If they ever do such a thing, this California trend is likely to meet with some resistance in many other parts of the country.

This post can also be viewed on themessthatgreenspanmade.blogspot.com.

Expectations Of A Dollar Collapse

So far — despite the huge run up in U.S. debt — the U.S. dollar has held strong during the financial crisis, however, Andy Xie expects a major collapse to come. He feels that pressures from China, and an overall loss of faith in the U.S. financial policy, will destroy the greenback. For more on this, read the following blog post from Mark Thoma.

Andy Xie expects the dollar to collapse:

If China loses faith the dollar will collapse, by Andy Xie, Commentary, Financial Times: Emerging economies such as China and Russia are calling for alternatives to the dollar as a reserve currency. The trigger is the Federal Reserve’s liberal policy of expanding the money supply to prop up America’s banking system and its over-indebted households. ...[T]he Fed may be forced into printing dollars massively, which would eventually trigger high inflation or even hyper-inflation and cause great damage to countries that hold dollar assets in their foreign exchange reserves.

The chatter over alternatives to the dollar mainly reflects the unhappiness with US monetary policy among the emerging economies that have amassed nearly $10,000bn in foreign exchange reserves, mostly in dollar assets. ...[T]he US situation is unique: it borrows in its own currency, and the dollar is the world’s dominant reserve currency. The US can disregard its creditors’ concerns for the time being without worrying about a dollar collapse. ...

The faith of the Chinese in America’s power and responsibility, and the petrodollar holdings of the gulf countries that depend on US military protection, are the twin props for the dollar’s global status. Ethnic Chinese ... may account for half of the foreign holdings of dollar assets. ...

The US could repair its balance sheet through asset sales and fiscal transfers instead of just printing money. ... The country’s vast and unexplored natural resource holdings could be auctioned off. Americans may view these ideas as unthinkable. It is hard to imagine that a superpower needs to sell the family silver to stay solvent. Hence, printing money seems a less painful way out. ...

Other currencies are not safe havens either. ... Central banks are punishing savers to redeem the sins of debtors and speculators. Unfortunately, ethnic Chinese are the biggest savers.

Diluting Chinese savings to bail out America’s failing banks and bankrupt households, though highly beneficial to the US national interest in the short term, will destroy the dollar’s global status. Ethnic Chinese demand for the dollar has been waning already. ...

America’s policy is pushing China towards developing an alternative financial system. ... Its recent decision to turn Shanghai into a financial centre by 2020 reflects China’s anxiety over relying on the dollar system. The year 2020 seems remote... However, if global stagflation takes hold, as I expect it to, it will force China to accelerate its reforms to float its currency and create a single, independent and market-based financial system. When that happens, the dollar will collapse.

Barry Eichengreen explains why using SDRs as a reserve currency, as has been suggested by the governor of the People's Bank of China, is not as easy as it might seem:

Commercialize the SDR now, by Barry Eichengreen, Commentary, Project Syndicate: Zhou Xiaochuan, the governor of the People’s Bank of China, made a splash prior to the recent G-20 summit by arguing that the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights should replace the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. ...

Sympathizers acknowledged the contradictions... Central banks understandably seek more reserves as their economies grow. But if those reserves mainly take the form of dollars, then their rising demand allows the United States to finance its external deficit at an artificially low cost. In turn, this allows unsustainable imbalances to build up, leading to an inevitable crash. ...

But skeptics question whether the SDR could ever replace the dollar as the world’s leading reserve currency, for the simple reason that the SDR is not a currency. It is a composite accounting unit in which the IMF issues credits to its members. Those credits ... cannot be used in the other transactions in which central banks and governments engage. ... This means that the SDR is not an attractive unit for official reserves.

This would not be easy to change. Despite the trials and tribulations of the American economy, dollar securities remain the dominant form of reserves because of the unparalleled depth and liquidity of US markets. Central banks can buy and sell dollar securities without moving those markets. There is also the convenience factor: dollars are widely used in a variety of other transactions. As a result, not even the euro has seriously challenged the dollar as the dominant reserve currency. ...

If China is serious about elevating the SDR to reserve-currency status, it should take steps to create a liquid market in SDR claims. It could issue its own SDR-denominated bonds. ... Of course, an earlier attempt was made to create a commercial market in SDR-denominated claims ... in the 1970’s... But these efforts ultimately went nowhere. The dollar being more liquid, its first-mover advantage proved impossible to surmount.

Overcoming that advantage now would require someone to act as market-maker ... and subsidise the market in its start-up phase. The obvious someone is the IMF. The Fund could stand ready to buy and sell SDR claims to all comers, ... at narrow bid/ask spreads competitive with those for dollars. ...

Transforming the SDR into a true international currency would require surmounting other obstacles. The IMF would have to be able to issue additional SDRs in periods of shortage... The IMF’s management would also have to be empowered to decide on SDR issuance, just as the Fed can decide to offer currency swaps. For the SDR to become a true international currency, in other words, the IMF would have to become more like a global central bank and international lender of last resort.

For worries about inflation, see Inflation Nation by Alan Meltzer (and also see Krugman's response, A History Lesson for Alan Meltzer).

[Note: A lot of people have noted the apparent contradiction in the concern from Krugman over deflation, and from Meltzer over inflation, e.g. Mankiw for one, but here's an example of this from Mankiw's colleague, Martin Feldstein, within the same article. It's simply a short-run, long-run distinction.]

This post can also be found on economistsview.typepad.com.

How Is The Economic Medicine Working?

The government has been injecting trillions of dollars into the economy, but how has it been working so far? James Picerno looks at recent events and attempts to answer that question in his blog post below. In addition Picerno takes a look at what lies ahead for the U.S. economy, and offers some words of wisdom for investors.

In late-March, we asked: Is the medicine working? By medicine we meant the massive injection of liquidity into the economy as a cure for fending off deflation and laying the groundwork for recovery. At the time, we were mildly encouraged, in part due to the rising inflation forecast as derived from the spread between the nominal and inflation-indexed 10-year Treasuries.

More than a month later, there's still reason for optimism, perhaps more so, thanks to the so-called green shoots that suggest better days ahead. Yet the rate spread, which is to say the market's inflation outlook, hasn't changed much since late-March. The current forecast is for inflation of 1.4% for the next 10 years, just barely up from around 1.3% from the end of the first quarter. In both cases, that's a healthy change from expecting flat pricing, as was the case at the end of 2008. Low inflation as far as the eye can see would be nice, but is that a reasonable expectation?

In the months ahead there will be a thin line between a healthy rise in inflation expectations and the potential for burdensome pricing pressures later on. Deflation is a hazard to be avoided for a number of reasons. Although we can't quite shut the book on the danger, the odds look increasingly in favor of mild inflation for the foreseeable future, as the chart above suggests. Behind this reasoning is the growing sentiment that the recession is at or near a bottom. Is it time for the Fed to begin tightening? Or are the green shoots still too tentative?

"We're seeing more indications of perhaps a bottoming in the economy," Bill O'Neill of LOGIC Advisors tells Dow Jones. "So there is an increasing—and it will continue to increase—concern surrounding inflation potential."

Gold, the perennial inflation hedge, seems to be considering the possibility, although this market hasn't quite made up its mind. The price of the metal has been hovering around $900 for much of this year, just below its all-time high of $1,033, set back in March 2008. The 10-year Treasury yield, meanwhile, has been climbing, recently bumping up against 3.2% on renewed worries that inflation may now be the bigger risk. Even so, a 10-year yield of 3.2% is still quite low.

None of the inflation anxiety is worrying the stock market, which has now reversed the selloff in the first quarter. Indeed, the S&P 500 is now marginally up on the year, as of last night's close, on expectations that by the end of this year the economy will be sitting up and prepared to get out of bed.

The big question is whether all the renewed hope that the worst is over is really just the byproduct of a bear market bounce in markets and inflation expectations? Given the extreme waves of selling last year and into March, a rebound was all but assured if the world economy didn't collapse. As we now know, it didn't. There are still lots of problems, but we'll all be here next year and so it was time to reprice assets upwards to reflect a humbled but otherwise enduring economic climate.

Investors have cheered the signs that the U.S. economy no longer seems to be contracting at an accelerating pace. Given the fears of what could have happened, that's certainly a reasonable response. Deciding that you're not going to fall into the abyss is always encouraging. But that's still a long way from arguing that growth is imminent, or that the economy won't tread water for a year or two.

The first phase of the post-apocalyptic visions that prevailed six months ago may be over. If so, now we're faced with the more difficult chore of deciding how to repair and rebuild the economy to foster growth while containing inflation. The hardest days are yet to come. Unless you're expecting a seamless transition, keeping some cash at the ready still makes sense, albeit less so than in past months. Volatility isn't banished, it's only hibernating, which suggests another round of value-oriented pricing opportunities in the major asset classes.

This post can also be viewed on capitalspectator.com.

Wages Are Falling Across America

We have been hearing a lot about unemployment, but there is another equally disturbing trend happening at the same time. In order to avoid layoffs some companies are asking employees to take wage cuts. While wage cuts might seem like no big deal — the employees still have their jobs after all — they can be devastating to the economy. For more on this, read the following blog post from Mark Thoma that looks at a recent article from Paul Krugman.

Are we doing enough to reduce the risk that we’ll face a sustained period of deflation and stagnation?:

Falling Wage Syndrome, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: Wages are falling all across America. Some of the wage cuts, like the givebacks by Chrysler workers, are the price of federal aid. Others, like the tentative agreement on a salary cut here at The Times, are the result of discussions between employers and their union employees. Still others reflect the brute fact of a weak labor market: workers don’t dare protest when their wages are cut, because they don’t think they can find other jobs.

Whatever the specifics, however, falling wages are a symptom of a sick economy. And they’re a symptom that can make the economy even sicker.

First things first: anecdotes about falling wages are proliferating, but how broad is the phenomenon? The answer is, very.

It’s true that many workers are still getting pay increases. But there are enough pay cuts out there that, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average cost of employing workers ... rose only two-tenths of a percent in the first quarter of this year — the lowest increase on record. Since the job market is still getting worse, it wouldn’t be at all surprising if overall wages started falling later this year.

But why is that a bad thing? After all, many workers are accepting pay cuts in order to save jobs. What’s wrong with that?

The answer lies in one of those paradoxes...: workers at any one company can help save their jobs by accepting lower wages, but when employers across the economy cut wages at the same time, the result is higher unemployment. ... So there’s no benefit to the economy from lower wages. Meanwhile, the fall in wages can worsen the economy’s problems on other fronts.

In particular, falling wages, and hence falling incomes, worsen the problem of excessive debt: your monthly mortgage payments don’t go down with your paycheck. America came into this crisis with household debt as a percentage of income at its highest level since the 1930s. Families are trying to work that debt down by saving more ... but as wages fall, they’re chasing a moving target. ... Things get even worse if businesses and consumers expect wages to fall further in the future. ...

Concern about falling wages isn’t just theory. Japan ... is an object lesson in how wage deflation can contribute to economic stagnation.

So what should we conclude from the growing evidence of sagging wages in America? Mainly that stabilizing the economy isn’t enough: we need a real recovery.

There has been a lot of talk lately about green shoots and all that, and there are indeed indications that the economic plunge that began last fall may be leveling off. The National Bureau of Economic Research might even declare the recession over later this year.

But the unemployment rate is almost certainly still rising. And all signs point to a terrible job market for many months if not years to come — which is a recipe for continuing wage cuts, which will in turn keep the economy weak.

To break that vicious circle, we basically need more: more stimulus, more decisive action on the banks, more job creation.

Credit where credit is due: President Obama and his economic advisers seem to have steered the economy away from the abyss. But the risk that America will turn into Japan — that we’ll face years of deflation and stagnation — seems, if anything, to be rising.

Here's a graph of the Phillips curve over the last two and a half years (2006:Q3 - 2008Q4) as measured by the year over year percentage change in the employment cost index (total compensation) versus the civilian unemployment rate:

Artificially restraining wages from falling is not the correct response, the key is to drive the unemployment rate down so that the labor market tightens and wages rise in response. That is why it's essential that stimulus programs provide a boost to employment, and I've wondered from the start if the stimulus programs we enacted have focused enough on providing employment opportunities. Building new infrastructure does provide long-term benefits, and that gives political cover to the large government expenditure and tax cuts that were enacted, but infrastructure projects alone do not give the maximum possible boost to employment. Providing jobs - some of which may not directly boost long-run productivity - is an essential component of short-run stabilization policy, and there is more that we could do to give unemployed workers opportunities for employment until jobs begin to reappear in the private sector.

This post can also be viewed on economistsview.typepad.com.

Fed Holds Steady...For Now...

Earlier this week the Fed decided to hold steady with their previous policies, however, it is still likely that they will need to provide additional easing in the months ahead. Mark Thoma looks at an article from Tim Duy, in his blog post below, that talks more about the economy and what's likely in store for Fed policy.

Despite Green Shoots, Odds Favor More Easing, by Tim Duy: The Fed took an interesting risk by holding policy steady on Wednesday.With green shoots all the rage, policymakers are ready to step to the sidelines as they monitor the progress of their many programs. And clearly, they must have known that the 3% level on 10-year Treasuries was dependent on the expectation that policymakers would expand the pace of outright purchases of those assets, but are betting that economic conditions will remain sufficiently weak to prevent a crippling increase in rates. Still, given that policymakers still see the economy in decline, albeit at a slower rate, the odds favor additional easing in the months ahead, especially considering expectations of a widening output gap. Recall that labor markets, and the threat of deflation, kept the Fed easing well past the end of the recession in 2001.

Short of an outbreak of inflation, or a unexpected and unlikely surge of growth, there is little reason to think that the Fed is ready to bring policy to a sustained pause. And an imminent rise in inflation remains an outside risk for the Fed; the focus remains consistently on disinflation or, worse yet, outright deflation. A key paragraph is:

In light of increasing economic slack here and abroad, the Committee expects that inflation will remain subdued. Moreover, the Committee sees some risk that inflation could persist for a time below rates that best foster economic growth and price stability in the longer term.

Policymakers are counting on a rising output gap (both here and abroad) and lags in the price setting process to keep inflation at bay. Indeed, this must be the case, as some of the current numbers are really not all that comforting. I am not inclined to place too much focus on headline inflation - oil prices appear to have found a bottom around $50 a barrel, and sustained hints of a firming of global economic activity would promise to send prices higher, thus offsetting the strong disinflationary impact of falling energy prices since the middle of 2008. In contrast to low year-over-year headline numbers, the personal income and outlays report for March revealed that core PCE prices gained by 0.2% in each of the past three months, pushing the annualized three month trend back above 2%:

And note that near-term inflation expectations have climbed back up into a normal range:

From this perspective, policymakers have done a good job anchoring inflation expectations against the possibility of deflation. Is this enough, however, to unsettle FOMC members? Despite these inflationary hints, it is simply unlikely that the Fed would ignore the disinflationary implications of the output gap. One way to ignore the gap is to argue that the US will revert to an emerging market inflation dynamic. I think such an argument requires a steady depreciation of the Dollar to hold - which could happen, but a Dollar crisis looks, for the moment, unlikely given relative global weakness. One could also argue that estimates of potential output are optimistic and don't reflect the importance of structural change in the economy. This is the issue that Nick Rowe at the Worthwhile Canadian Initiative attempts to tackle:

Even in the short run a good banking and financial system will be important in re-allocating capital between growing and declining sectors, if there are shifts in relative demand. If people want fewer cars and more restaurant meals, but banks cannot shift loans from car manufacturers to restaurants, the Short Run Aggregate Supply curve may shift left, because the restaurants won't be able to expand to meet demand, and car manufacturers' prices or wages may be sticky downwards.

If you see the financial crisis as causing the recession by shifting the SRAS curve left, then monetary and fiscal policies, which shift the AD curve right, are not the appropriate cure. Even if you see leftward shifts of the SRAS curve as only part of the story, you will see limits on what monetary and fiscal policy can achieve. When expansionary monetary and fiscal policies start to cause excessive inflation, before output and employment have returned fully to normal, you will know that purely AD policies have reached the limit of what can be expected from them.

Nick is slapped down by Brad DeLong:

But if bad banks have shifted the AS curve inward, then right now we should have stagflation: depression and inflation, as output falls and prices rise. We don't. The argument that fiscal and monetary policies won't reduce unemployment to normal levels because we have a supply side problem is completely incoherent in an AS-AD framework.

Brad is correct that in a traditional AS-AD framework, bad banks are demand shocks, not supply shocks. There is still something about Nick's argument that is important - the financial system redirected capital investment into housing and consumption related activities. Presumably, potential output includes the ability to build and sell as many houses the US economy produced at the height of the housing bubble. But what good is that output if we don’t want to build and sell that many houses in the future? How do we redirect capital away from those sectors? And how long does it take? Arguably, the narrowing of the US trade deficit is pushing that adjustment forward, as the US economy can't focus entirely on producing nontradable goods. Recall Brad DeLong from 2005:

There is an alternative scenario, one in which foreigners'--including foreign central banks'--desired holdings of dollar-denominated assets shortly hit the wall, and the asset price shifts that result from desired holdings' hitting the wall reduce, or do not increase, confidence in the dollar.

In this alternative scenario, the U.S. has to move about ten million workers out of currently-favored sectors--construction, home-equity-credit financed consumer expenditures, and so on--into export and import-competing manufactures. How much structural unemployment does such a sectoral shift require, and how long does the structural unemployment last? Other countries have to shift up to forty million workers out of export manufactures into other industries, and to generate demand for the products of those industries (without destabilizing their own monetary systems and asset prices, as Japan appears to have done at the end of the 1980s). The U.S. Federal Reserve would have to cope with whatever inflationary pressures are generated by rising import prices. Foreign central banks would have to cope with whatever stresses on their own asset prices are created by enormous losses of value in the stocks and bonds of their exporting companies.

If structural unemployment is rising - not because banks are currently bad, but engaged in bad behavior in the past - attempts to reduce unemployment back to pre-recession levels will yield higher inflation. This problem is minimized if labor resources can be quickly redirected into other sectors, a process that Nick above is implying is hampered by the existence now of bad banks. But, as Brad suggested in 2005, getting to inflation in the current environment seems to require a Dollar collapse - a story that for now is difficult to tell.

All of which is interesting, but even if you believe that structural unemployment is rising, I don't think anyone believes it is near the 8.5% rate for March (not to mention the underemployment rate of 15.6%). Nor does anyone expect that recent green shoots are sufficient to keep unemployment from rising further. Moreover, note that the Employment Costs Index released today reveals the continued slide in employee compensation costs - consistent with the FOMC's concerns about economic slack. Indeed, the ECI highlights the risks of the Fed's move to hold steady policy: Declining wage growth, coupled with higher interest rates, would play havoc with household efforts to reduce balance sheets and intensify the need to boost saving rates. Hence why the risks still favor additional policy easing - especially if programs such as TALF and PPIP are less successful than imagined.

In short, the shoots are much too green and the output gap much too wide to stimulate much discussion on Constitution Avenue that the end of easing has conclusively been reached. A pause to assess, yes. But Fed officials will be looking for clear and convincing evidence that economic activity is both self sustaining (not likely to fade after the initial burst of federal stimulus moves through the pipeline) and sufficient to substantially reduce the output gap before they sound the all clear signal. An end to the rapid pace of job loss is very different from a return to steady job growth. Again, recall the sustained pattern of easing in the wake of the 2001 recession - we need to go a long way up from -6% GDP growth before the job engine is started. To be sure, there should be some lingering concern that the Fed will act quickly (or at least the markets will act quickly), if there is a perceived need to withdraw monetary accommodation. But the data are well short of what would be necessary to justify such a shift in policy in the near future.

This post can also be viewed on economistsview.typepad.com.

We Need A Root-And-Branch Reorganization Of The Financial System

Some people are open to the government handing over trillions of dollars to the banks, but no taxpayers want the money handed over without proper controls in place that will ensure it goes to good use. This has been one of the biggest issues the public has had with the bailout efforts thus far. For that reason Steve Waldman is calling for a root-and-branch reorganization of the financial system. For more on this, read the following blog post from Mark Thoma.

Steve Waldman says "we need a root-and-branch reorganization of the financial system":

Value for value, Steve Waldman: Would it have been better if Timothy Geithner had had the power to guarantee all bank debt early on? As James Surowiecki reminds us, that was part of the Swedish solution. Justin Fox plausibly suggests that we might have avoided a lot of pain with a fast, full guarantee.

But that's not the point. The question isn't whether we could have avoided this crisis, if only we had cut a big check. We could have, and that was not lost to any of us debating these issues more than a year ago. (See e.g. me or Mark Thoma.) Had we done so, the near-to-medium term fiscal costs might have been less than they probably will be now. So, with 20/20 hindsight, would it have been a good idea?

How you answer that question depends upon how you view the crisis. Is it an aberration, a shock to a basically sound financial system, or is it a painful symptom of an even more dangerous condition? ...

If you think that our financial system just needs some tweaks, some consolidation of regulators' organizational charts and sterner supervision, then you should prefer that we had just cut a check, passed Sarbanes/Oxley Book II, and moved on. But that is not what I, or most proponents of temporary receivership for insolvent banks, believe.

If you believe, as I do, that we need a root-and-branch reorganization of the financial system, which must necessarily involve the dismemberment and intrusive restraint of deeply entrenched institutions, does that mean pain is the only way forward, "the worse the better" in the old revolutionary cliché? It need not mean that. But it does mean that palliative measures, like giving the banks money, would have to be attached to curative measures, like enacting capital requirements and imposing regulatory burdens that would force financial behemoths to break themselves up or become boring narrow banks. For almost two years, policymakers at the Fed and the Treasury, including Secretary Geithner, have offered bail-out after bail-out and asked for nothing serious in return.

Do I regret that Henry Paulson was not empowered to issue a blanket guarantee of bank assets early on, as the Swedes did? No, I don't regret that at all. Why not? Because I think that "Hank the Tank" was a crappy negotiator... He would have offered the financial system sugar without requiring it to make the medicine go down. He may believe, quite sincerely, that a cure would be worse than the disease. He may believe that, but he is wrong. ...

You may believe that we have learned our lesson, that if we can just get some stability and comfort for a while we are prepared to do what must be done. That's a respectable position. But I don't share it, and neither do the majority of Americans who are unwilling to allow their representatives to sign off on any more expensive aspirin. We want value for value, an ironclad commitment of root and branch reform in exchange for the unimaginable sums of money we are being asked to hand over. ... Congress would, because the public would, support large, explicit transfers, if they were attached to reforms sufficiently radical to prevent a recurrence, and suitably punitive towards the people who managed the system that brought us here. Value for value. ...

I ... would be willing to hold my nose and tolerate a Swedish-style guarantee of bank creditors. I'd acquiesce to that even without formal nationalization. Nationalization is ... a means to an end, and the desired end is a world in which too big to fail is too big to exist for any financial institution that originates or holds credit risk in any form. Secretary Geithner could send a bill to Congress today that would put all banks with a balance sheet of over $50B into run-off mode... I'd fax my Congressman and support a $2T on-budget buyout of bank creditors as part of that bill, as long as it had teeth. ("Teeth" would imply making sure that off-balance-sheet and derivative exposures were included in the size cap, etc.)

It's not that us pitchfork-totin' populists are unwilling to pay the bill. It's that we want to know that in exchange for writing a very, very large check, the people that we are paying will actually deliver the goods. Given the behavior of bankers before the crisis and of shifty policymakers during, we have every reason to watch warily and to insist upon every precaution while we hand over suitcase after suitcase of freshly printed Federal Reserve notes.

This post can also be found on economistsview.typepad.com.

Stress Tests Reveal Three Banks In Need Of Additional Funding

The controversial stress tests commissioned by the government on the 19 largest financial institutions have revealed at least 3 in need of additional funding. These stress tests were meant to ensure that banks have enough capital reserves to last through the recession. For more on this, read the following article from Housing Wire.

At least three of the 19 financial institutions with assets in excess of $100bn may face pressure to build up capital reserves after failing to meet desired operational projections through the government-mandated stress tests, unnamed sources told the Wall Street Journal. The identities of the three firms remained confidential at the time this story went to press, but analysts told the Journal they likely include regional banks with commercial real estate exposure in the Midwest and Southeast.

The stress tests aimed to determine whether major US banks retain enough capital to weather even the more adverse economic projections. Federal officials offered three alternatives to banks that lack sufficient reserves: raise private investor funds, receive additional government aid or convert the government’s existing preferred shares into common shares, effectively placing part of the firm in government ownership.

The Federal Reserve, in reporting stress test methods late Friday, say most banks retain enough capital to weather a longer, more severe recession, although deteriorating economic conditions affect the reserve capital held among some banks.

This article can also be found on housingwire.com.

Geithner's New PPIP Plan Looks Too Much Like Failed TALF Program

Hopefully Geithners new PPIP plan that was created to deal with toxic assets works out better than the TALF failure, but unfortunately it looks eerily familiar. For more on this, read the following blog post from Mark Thoma.

The TALF program intended to increase auto loans, student loans, and credit card lending has a lot in common with the Geithner public private investment plan to remove toxic assets from bank balance sheets, including the valuable non-recourse loan feature. The fact that the TALF program is not living up to expectations - not even close - leads to questions about whether the Geithner plan will encounter similar problems:

Federal Program to Boost Private Lending Struggles to Get Money to Consumers, by Neil Irwin, Washington Post: In its first two months, the government's signature initiative to support consumer lending has fallen well short of expectations, deploying only a fraction of the amount officials had hoped to extend to stimulate auto loans, student loans and credit card lending. ...

Under [the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or] TALF, private investors ... put up a relatively small amount of money to be matched with a larger loan from the Federal Reserve. The combined funds are then used to purchase newly created, highly rated securities, which in turn fund a wide range of consumer and business lending.

If the securities become more valuable, the private investors stand to repay their government loans and make a healthy profit; if the securities plummet in value, the investors can lose only what they put up originally...

Officials envisioned TALF supporting tens of billions of dollars a month in new lending, saying it could eventually total $1 trillion. But in March, when it was launched, it backed only $4.7 billion in auto loans and credit cards. For April, it logged only $1.7 billion.

Sources involved in the program said private investors have been reluctant to work with the government, which they view as an unreliable business partner. ... There are restrictions on the business activities of participants in the program. ... But perhaps more significant ... is a fear that the government could retroactively change the terms, exacting new limits on what investors can pay their executives, for example, or trying to claw back profits that firms make in the program. ...

Federal Reserve officials have privately urged President Obama and congressional leaders to publicly state that the government views investors in voluntary programs such as TALF differently than it does companies that need a federal bailout.

Investors are not the only ones who need comforting, though. The Fed relies on primary dealers, or brokerage houses, to play a key role as intermediaries in TALF...

But the primary dealers have been extremely cautious..., hobbling the program's progress... Lawyers at the New York Fed ... have been working to help the brokers and investors work through the issues, and government officials are hopeful about the program's future. ...

The Public-Private Investment Program, designed to buy loans and securities from banks, is structured similarly to TALF. ...

And the differences between the PPIP and TALF programs that I can think of, e.g. that the PPIP has toxic assets as part of the bargain, and some of the banks will need a bailout so the reassurances about executive pay, etc. can't be made in these cases, are additional factors working against the PPIP's success.

This post can also be viewed on economistsview.typepad.com.

U.K. Budget Met With Fierce Opposition

If we thought things were bad over here in the U.S., at least we might be able to take some comfort in the fact it is looking as bad or worse in the U.K. Alistair Darlings just released the 2009 budget for the U.K., and while it does not look pretty, the IMF thinks he is being way too optimistic in his projects. From the looks of things the U.K. is going to be adding an incredible amount of debt to their already enormous deficit, and growth is unlikely to come for a few more years. For more on this, read the following blog post from Tim Iacono.

The new U.K. budget announced a short time ago is being greeted with boos and catcalls as taxes are being raised and debts continue to mount - they sound a bit like the state of California with the important distinction that the Golden State doesn't own a printing press.

This report in the Telegraph provides the details:

Alistair Darling has pledged to hit Britain’s richest workers and savers with a smattering of new taxes to help support the UK through its worst recession since the 1930s.

In what is likely to go down in history as the most downbeat and depressed Budget in peacetime history, the Chancellor pledged to raise the income tax rate for those earning over £150,000 to 50pc, hearkening back to the high tax rates imposed by Governments in the 1960s and 1970s.

He also confirmed that the Government will be forced to borrow £175bn this year and £173bn the next, and would have to increase the size of the national debt from recent levels of below 40pc to almost 80pc within the next five years.

It seems that almost every developed nation in the world is now in the process of turning Japanese in that national debt relative to GDP is rapidly approaching parity. In the U.S., we'll reach that point before you know it.

There's a complete summary of the new U.K. budget here.

If this video clip is any indication, it's getting a bit testy across the pond.

Darling has already downgraded his economic forecasts from just a few months ago which, as is the case for nearly all government projections, were overly optimistic for 2009. He now pegs economic growth at minus 3.5 percent this year with a rosier outlook for 2010.

In something of an embarrassment for U.K. government economists, the IMF cast a bit of cold water on their updated forecast for next year, predicting another period of contraction according to this report in the Guardian.

Britain will be stuck in recession for another year as consumers reeling from the housing crash cut back their spending, the International Monetary Fund warns today – undermining Alistair Darling's budget claim that growth will resume at the end of the year.

In its twice-yearly World Economic Outlook, the IMF predicts that recession in the UK will be "quite severe", with the economy shrinking by 4.1% this year, and continuing to contract, by 0.4%, in 2010. In the budget, Darling forecast 1.25% growth in 2010.

Somehow, given the way things have deteriorated over the last six months, it wouldn't be surprising to see even the IMF forecast prove to be too optimistic.

This post can also be viewed on themessthatgreenspanmade.blogspot.com.

What Will The Government Do With Goldman Sachs?

Storied investment banking firm, Goldman Sachs, is preparing to pay the government back around $5 billion in borrowed TARP funds, but whether or not the government will allow it to happen is the real story. Goldman no longer wants to be burdened with the rules and regulations being imposed on them by the government, and thanks to a $12 billion windfall from the AIG bailout the firm is in a position to return the funds. If they are allowed to return the funds, though, there is worry that it will put the other bailed out banks in a precarious position. For more on this, read the following article from Money Morning's Shah Gilani.

Not a fan of socialism? Me either. But, if the federal government has to backstop free market excesses with taxpayer dollars, how will it eventually unravel the veil, or tarp of intervention? Or should it? The answers are about to unfold before our eyes.

In the case of the government and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), a decision on whether Goldman can repay government bailout money and be freed to pay its employees whatever it wants, may determine the winners and losers coming out of this financial collapse, and what kind of government Americans will end up with.

In her extraordinary 1999 book, “Goldman Sachs the Culture of Success,” Lisa Endlich vividly chronicles the “history, mystique and remarkable success of the world’s premier investment bank.” That same year, the storied partnership structure of Goldman was junked in a wildly successful initial public offering (IPO).

I still keep three pages of notes distilled from Endlich’s book on how to create and foster a culture of success, a la the Goldman model. They now seem quaint in light of the winner-take-all at the expense of the shareholders mentality that eviscerated the old-school standards.

That’s not to say that Goldman isn’t still wildly successful. On Monday, Goldman pre-announced first quarter net income of $1.81 billion. Record net revenue of $6.56 billion from trading fixed income, currencies and commodities was offset by losses in stock trading, real estate, investment banking and money management. Nonetheless, earnings were almost twice analysts’ expectations.

Yesterday (Tuesday), on the heels of its good performance, Goldman announced that it had priced a public offering of 40,650,407 shares of common stock at $123 per share. Goldman will be its own sole underwriter and total gross proceeds are expected to yield approximately $5 billion.

Ironically, $5 billion is what Goldman needs to pay back the U.S. government in order to escape the salary and bonus caps imposed on bailout recipients.

A brief history.

On the remarkable day of September 15, 2008 Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. announced its intention to file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. On the same day, venerable investment bank Merrill Lynch disappeared into the waiting arms of Bank of America Corp. (BAC). Six short days later, on a Sunday afternoon, the U.S. Federal Reserve announced approval of expedited applications by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley (MS) to change their status from investment banks to bank holding companies. The rapid approval of their applications would, the Fed said, “provide increased funding support” allowing both banks to borrow directly and permanently from the Fed’s Discount Window and its other capital liquidity enhancing facilities.

But that wouldn’t be enough. As the crisis mounted, on Sept. 23, Goldman raised $5 billion from billionaire investor Warren Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (BRK.A, BRK.B). And with the storied investor now onboard, Goldman rushed to raise another $5.75 billion in a common stock offering.

On Oct. 14, with the mushrooming cloud of the crisis enveloping seemingly every major bank in the country, then-Treasury Secretary Henry M Paulson (formerly Goldman Sachs’ Chairman and CEO) and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke summoned the nine largest bank chief executives to Washington where they were told that they would each take a piece of government capital. Only Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC) is on record as saying it didn’t need the money, but the handout was forced on it too. Goldman itself took $10 billion.

On Wall Street, and nowhere more so than at Goldman, it’s about compensation. But recipients of bailout money are now facing the full disclosure of their executive compensation deals, as well as having to obtain nonbinding shareholder voting on compensation issues.

The Treasury is advocating a salary ceiling for recipient senior executives of $500,000 and any additional compensation to be paid in restricted stock that vests only when government funds have been entirely repaid. And there are restrictions on golden parachutes and threats that Congress will impose a 90% bonus tax.

It’s enough to make Wall Street quake in its canyon.

With the public backlash against the taxpayer-funded bonuses paid to executives and traders at crippled firms, banks are desperate to return government bailout money so they can be freed from government salary and bonus oversight.

But unfortunately for many of these banks, oversight is mandated for any recipient of “exceptional assistance,” which is defined as assistance of more than $5 billion.

No wonder Goldman wants to pay back $5 billion of the $10 billion it got.

I have nothing against the free market setting compensation benchmarks, or private companies paying successful executives whatever their shareholders vote to be acceptable. And I’m not singling out Goldman Sachs. But, nowhere else in the U.S. economy - or at the highest levels of government - is there anything like Goldman’s visible and invisible hands at work. And they’re working in the open and more insidiously, behind the scenes and through lobbyists, to make themselves a lot of money.

There is simply not enough space in any book, let alone any article, to list the power, placement and influence of current and former Goldman Sachs alumni pulling the levers of hedge funds, corporations, politicians and governments. If you want to enlighten yourself about what you don’t know about these players, simply Google: “List Goldman Sachs alumni.”

Goldman, as much as any investment bank, got its hands dirty in the subprime securities business and the credit default swap business. As to its influence and its claim to premier bank status, the first question that comes to my mind is: Would Goldman even exist today if Hank Paulson hadn’t had Goldman’s current CEO Lloyd Blankenfein in on meetings about saving American International Group Inc. (AIG)?

Out of the $185 billion that AIG received from taxpayers, Goldman got $12.5 billion for exposure it had to credit default swaps written by AIG. I’ve been told by some of my hedge fund and investment banking friends that Goldman deserved that money and that the entire counterparty structure related to almost every credit default swap was a risk.

But I like to point out that Goldman is only smarter than its peers because its trading desks are lighter on their feet. I remind them that Goldman stuffed the pipelines with toxic structured collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and then was nimble enough to cover themselves better by buying credit default swaps to hedge their exposure to their own toxic slime and institutions that are too-big-to-fail, exactly like AIG.

What happens now with Goldman Sachs will set the precedent for everything else that the government will do or allow in the future with bailout recipients and industries. Will Goldman be freed up to overpay its risk takers and to make greater wagers as it also seeks to become too-big-to-fail? Will impositions be made on the corporate level, industry level, systemic level? Will free markets be free to leverage taxpayers indefinitely?

The argument, most recently made in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal op-ed page by Jonathan Macey, a law professor at Yale, that “demonetizing executive pay will also drive the best managers out of private companies and into hedge funds and other boutique investment firms” implies that there is a limited amount of talent available in America, which is a supposition that I find myopic, at best.

Besides, aren’t these the same people that got us into this mess?

And while letting public companies be run by shareholders - as Macey suggests - is supposed to work in principle, shareholders have been marginalized by the same Wall Street system that protects the institutions whose stocks and bonds they sell, trade and profit from.

All eyes should be on the curious relationship between government and Goldman for clues as to what shape the landscape will take when we eventually exit this calamity.

I don’t want our companies, our institutions or our economy socialized any more than Adam Smith would. But I do want to see the public tail wagging the dogs of Wall Street and government.

This post can also be viewed on moneymorning.com.

From Money Morning:

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