Showing posts with label Lehman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lehman. Show all posts

Thursday, October 1, 2009

Did The Lehman Failure Really Matter?

Economist Mark Thoma discusses whether Lehman's failure significantly worsened the economic condition at the time. While some would argue that it would have been better to have let the troubled financial institutions fail, they often have trouble supporting this claim with data, as the following from Economist's View explains.

There's a lot of revisionism going on over the consequences of the Lehman's collapse. The standard view is that allowing Lehman to fail was a mistake, and hence government intervention could have lessened the severity of the crisis. Government intervention wouldn't have avoided problems altogether, but the problems wouldn't have been as bad as what we experienced.

However, a few people are now pushing the idea that the failure of Lehman wasn't a primary contributor to the problems that financial markets and the economy experienced. According to the revisionist view, government intervention would not have made any difference, the problems would have been just as bad either way. The notion that government intervention would not have helped is, of course, the main point that this group wishes to emphasize. However, the revisionist view does not hold up to closer examination:

Why the Lehman failure did change everything, by Richard Robb, Economists' Forum: For anyone who was engaged in the financial markets during the week of September 15, 2008, Lehman changed everything. It was obvious. So what could be more tempting to finance professors than to overturn this conventional wisdom? Descartes described the man of letters who takes more pride in his speculations “the more they are removed from common sense,” and so showing that the Lehman collapse was inconsequential has spawned a minor literature.

The latest contribution by John Cochrane and Luigi Zingales, like others before them, rests partly on misunderstanding of the data. The authors deduce that Lehman wasn’t the main cause of last autumn’s turmoil by inspecting the daily movements in the spread between Overnight Interest Rate Swaps and three-month Libor, which they define as “the rate at which banks can borrow unsecured for three months.”

But a better definition of Libor under the circumstances was “the rate at which banks said they can borrow”. Libor is the result of a survey, not a measure of actual transactions. In the week of September 15 last year, big banks refused to settle foreign exchange with each other. They were not lending interbank for three month terms, so Libor during that week tells us little.

We could say the same thing for OIS. Volume was light to nonexistent in the week of September 15 last year. What we do know is that three-month T-bills traded at 0.04 per cent on September 17, down from 1.47 per cent on Friday September 12. These are real data that ought to impress the professors that the market was breaking down as fast as it knows how.

John Taylor, the father of the Lehman-was-no-big-deal thesis, wrote in a Wall Street Journal op-ed last year that spreads between T-bills and Libor “remained in that range [of the previous year] through the rest of the week” after Lehman’s demise. In fact, in the year prior to Lehman’s collapse, the peak spread was 2.05 per cent; on September 17, 2009 it reached 3.00 per cent. (Of course, any conclusions based on Libor that week are equally unreliable.)

The other principal mistake of the Lehman deniers is their assumption that the incident unfolded entirely on September 15, 2008 and any effect had to be observable by that morning. But during the final two weeks of September, the market still had to absorb the news that the Securities and Exchange Commission had no plan for an orderly transfer of client assets in the US, while Lehman Brothers International Europe would be handed over to an administration process designed for liquidating grocery stores. ...

There is plenty of room to debate the larger counterfactual: if the government had never bailed out Bear Stearns and other too-big-to-fail firms that followed, would Lehman have mattered? If the government had never bailed out anyone at all, would we be better off? But given the bailouts that preceded the Lehman failure, the Lehman failure did in fact change everything. Sometimes things that are obvious turn out to be true.

This post has been republished from Mark Thoma's blog, Economist's View.

Wednesday, August 12, 2009

What If The Government Had Saved Lehman?

Would saving Lehman have lessened the economic turmoil that followed when the investment giant went under? Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff discusses what we can learn from the collapse of a "too big to fail" financial institution and where we should go from here. See the following post from Economist's View.

Ken Rogoff:

The Confidence Game, by Kenneth Rogoff, Commentary, Project Syndicate: Next month marks the one year anniversary of the collapse of ... Lehman Brothers. The fall of Lehman marked the onset of a global recession and financial crisis the likes of which the world has not seen since the Great Depression of the 1930’s. ...

The overwhelming consensus in the policy community is that if only the government had bailed out Lehman, the whole thing would have been a hiccup and not a heart attack. Famous investors and leading policymakers alike have opined that in our ultra-interconnected global economy, a big financial institution like Lehman can never be allowed to fail. ...

Unfortunately, the conventional post-mortem on Lehman is wishful thinking. It basically says that no matter how huge the housing bubble, how deep a credit hole the United States (and many other countries) had dug, and how convoluted the global financial system, we could have just grown our way out of trouble. Patch up Lehman, move on,... and nothing bad ever need have happened.

The fact is global imbalances in debt and asset prices had been building up to a crescendo for years, and ... there was no easy way out. The United States was showing all the warning signs of a deep financial crisis long in advance of Lehman...

The entire financial system was totally unprepared to deal with the inevitable collapse of the housing and credit bubbles. The system had reached a point where it had to be bailed out and restructured. And there is no realistic political or legal scenario where such a bailout could have been executed without some blood on the streets. Hence, the fall of a large bank or investment bank was inevitable as a catalyst to action.

The problem with letting Lehman go under was not the concept but the execution. The government should have moved in aggressively to cushion the workout of Lehman’s complex derivative book, even if this meant creative legal interpretations or pushing through new laws...

The right lesson from Lehman should be that the global financial system needs major changes in regulation and governance. The current safety net approach may work in the short term but will ultimately lead to ballooning and unsustainable government debts, particularly in the US and Europe.

Asia may be willing to sponsor the west for now, but not in perpetuity. ... Within a few years, western governments will have to sharply raise taxes, inflate, partially default, or some combination of all three. As painful as it may seem, it would be far better to start bringing fundamentals in line now. ...

The "hiccup not a heart attack" sets up a false comparison. Had Lehman been bailed out things might not have been quite so bad, or followed a slower downward trajectory, but it wouldn't have been just a hiccup. I don't think many people make the claim that "Patch up Lehman,... and nothing bad ever need have happened."

But the main thing I want to know is if he saying we should start balancing the budget and tightening monetary policy right now, at the trough of the cycle. It seems like that's the message at the end, but I must be reading it wrong.

This post has been republished from Mark Thoma's blog, Economist's View.